



Düsseldorfer Institut für Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik
Duesseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy

Henrike Paepcke

Another U.N. Secretary-General
soon decapitated?

DIAS ANALYSIS
No. 14 May 2005

www.dias-online.org

Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V.
c/o Juristische Fakultät der Heinrich-Heine-Universität
Universitätsstr. 1 D-40225 Düsseldorf

Henrike Paepcke
heads the Directorate for International Organizations and NGOs at the Dues-
seldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS) and works as a con-
sultant for the Peace and Security Funders Group. Henrike has studied politi-
cal science and holds a PhD from the University of Hamburg.

Henrike Paepcke can be reached at paepcke@dias-online.org.

Henrike Paepcke
Another U.N. Secretary-General soon decapitated? DIAS Analysis No. 14,
Duesseldorf, 2005.

Published by
Duesseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy
Law Department of the Heinrich Heine University
Universitätsstraße 1 D-40225 Duesseldorf

www.dias-online.org

© 2005, Duesseldorf Institut for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS)

ISBN:

Contents

Another U.N. Secretary-General soon decapitated? 4

1. Pulling the trigger: the oil-for-food scandal 5

 Building the case against Annan and the United Nations..... 5

 Clueless superpower?..... 8

2. Introducing the blueprint for U.N. reform..... 9

3. On the same road to failure as the “Agenda for Peace”?.....10

 Unfavorable domestic conditions.....11

 Rising political tensions13

 Personal attacks15

 Shattered moral voice.....16

4. The next Secretary-General and U.N. reform—firmly under U.S. control17

Another U.N. Secretary-General soon decapitated?

Kofi Annan's March 2005 report on the progress of the Millennium Development Goals entitled "*In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*"¹ is probably the most encompassing blueprint for U.N. reform ever. In the post Cold-war era, reforming the U.N. has become one of the U.N. Secretary-General's primary tasks and benchmarks for success. In late 1996, Annan agreed it would be a difficult task but rejected the notion he would take on "a job from hell".² He might have been deadly wrong.

Once "Washington's man"³— when he was U.S. President Clinton's chosen candidate to replace troublemaker Boutros Boutros-Ghali—Annan is under heavier attack by the United States than his predecessor ever was. The Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) quagmire is not only questioning Annan's moral authority and personal integrity. The ongoing attacks on Annan might also endanger the U.N. reform project as the mixed history of post-Cold War U.S.-U.N. relations under Boutros-Ghali's leadership suggests.

The following analysis is aimed to illustrate the ramifications of the OFFP scandal for U.N. reform by taking into account the lessons of the Boutros Boutros-Ghali Era. It is assumed that the reasons why Boutros-Ghali became a *persona non grata* in the U.S. can shed more light on the limits and prospects of Annan's reform plans. The main features of the office of the Secretary-General are the key to a better understanding of what is currently at stake: This office is based on three pillars, all of which determine the power and authority of the incumbent—including the power to push the member states for (reform) action. Beyond fulfilling his administrative duties, the Secretary-General plays a political and moral role. At the same time, he has to perform a delicate balancing act. He is supposed to defend the U.N.'s principles and secure the support of the member states without giving in to individual members' interests and snubbing others'.

Boutros-Ghali failed to keep the balance, and the United States voted him out of office in 1996. Down with him went his ambitious plan for reforming U.N. peacekeeping, the "Agenda for Peace" (1992). Given the U.S. reaction to the OFFP scandal, one wonders if Annan could be the next "failed" U.N. Secretary-General.

To better assess the chances for the U.N. reform project to succeed, the key parameters of the OFFP scandal and Annan's blueprint for reform will be examined first. They provide the background against which U.S. support for U.N. reform (or the lack thereof) will be reviewed in a second step, followed by a closer look at Annan's office and the limits of his power.

¹ The report was released on March 21, 2005, and is available online at: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>.

² PBS Online NewsHour Interview with Kofi Annan, December 16, 1996; http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec96/annan_12-16.html.

³ *Ibid.*

1. Pulling the trigger: the oil-for-food scandal

On December 1, 2004, U.S. Senator Norm Coleman (R-Minnesota) provoked an avalanche of accusations against Annan by stating, “while many questions concerning Oil-for-Food remain unanswered, one conclusion has become abundantly clear: Kofi Annan should resign.”⁴

As chairman of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations—one of five Congressional committees looking into the U.N.’s management of the Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP)—Senator Coleman and his fellow legislators have been questioning witnesses and gathering evidence for several months; apparently enough to publicly assault Annan.

The media immediately jumped onto the attack wagon.⁵ And a few days later, Rep. Roger Wicker (Rep., Mississippi) started working the floors of the House of Representatives to find co-sponsors for a resolution (H.Res. 869) calling on Kofi Annan to resign “due to the allegations of fraud, mismanagement, and abuse within the United Nations oil-for-food program.” The dump-Annan movement soon counted 59 co-signers.⁶

For Senator Coleman, the case is imminent: “...the most extensive fraud in the history of the U.N. occurred on his watch (...) as long as Mr. Annan remains in charge, the world will never be able to learn the full extent of the bribes, kickbacks and under-the-table payments that took place under the U.N.’s collective nose.” Nile Gardiner of the Heritage Foundations speaks of the “biggest financial fraud of modern times”.⁷

Did the U.N. indeed betray the entire international community—including U.S. taxpayers—and are the responsible players within the U.N., on top of all Annan, now trying to escape justice?

Building the case against Annan and the United Nations

By taking early legislative action, Coleman and his colleagues sidelined the Independent Inquiry Committee, assigned by Annan to investigate the OFFP case in April 2004. At first glance, Coleman’s impatience with the U.N.-approved investigations team seems fit: When the Inquiry Committee, led by former U.S. Federal Reserve Bank chairman Paul Volcker, finally issued its first interim report on February 3, 2005, it did not deliver the long-awaited detailed answers to some pressing questions. The report points out critical failures on the part of the U.N. but is inconclusive.⁸ With the main focus on the U.N. Secretariat and its personnel, it uncovers, among various auditing and procurement irregularities, that Benon Sevan, head of OFFP’s oversight agency, accepted oil concessions from Saddam Hussein on behalf of a Panama oil company. (It is likely, albeit unproven, that Sevan benefited personally from this deal.) Much to the dismay of the

⁴ Norm Coleman: Annan Must Go, *Wall Street Journal*, December 1, 2004.

⁵ Fox, BBC and CNN broadcasted several interviews with Coleman and a series of other programs on the OFFP, all negative in tone. See News Hounds (www.newshounds.us) for examples of FoxNews special reporting such as: Breaking Point: U.N. Blood Money. Kofi Annan Under Fire, FoxNews, February 13, 2005; <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,146879,00.html>.

⁶ Congress & Kofi, *The National Review*, December 7, 2004; <http://www.nationalreview.com/editorial/editors/200412071236.asp>. The bill was referred to the House Committee on International Relations on December 6, 2004.

⁷ Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.: The Volcker Investigation into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Scandal: Why It Lacks Credibility, Heritage Foundation Background #1819, February 1, 2005; <http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/bg1819.cfm>.

⁸ Independent Inquiry Commission into the UN Oil-for-Food Programme: Interim Report, February 3, 2005; <http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportFeb2005.pdf>.

Congressional investigators, the first Volcker report does not provide any insight into Annan's role in the OFFP.⁹ What has Annan supposedly done wrong? Coleman's statements, along with the editorials of *New York Times* columnist William Safire¹⁰, provide a good overview of the major charges against the head of the United Nations as well as the organization.

- First, Coleman, Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, his Democratic counterpart on the Senate Investigations Committee, and other Congressional members bemoan the lacking U.N. information provided to the U.S. Senate.¹¹ The U.N.'s allegedly dual refusal to hand over certain U.N. internal audits to the Senate as well as to allow U.N. officials (and Volcker Committee members) testify before Coleman's Committee has prompted Safire to report "cover up" tactics: "If legislative investigators were prosecutors, the name of the game Annan and his enablers are playing would be called 'obstruction of justice'."
- Second, Coleman claims that OFFP dollars were given to terrorist and terrorist organizations.¹² In a similar fashion, Safire links the OFFP scandal to the continuing insurgency in Iraq and the dangers to U.S. and allied troops: "...money swindled from Oil-for-Food may be funding the insurgency against coalition troops in Iraq and other terrorist activities against U.S. interests. Simply put, the troops would probably not have been placed in such danger if the U.N. had done its job in administering sanctions and Oil-for-Food."
- Third, like Coleman, Safire is convinced that Saddam's "rip-off" would have not happened without the "connivance of corrupt U.N. officials and companies protected by Security Council members like Russia and France."¹³
- Fourth and mostly important, the scandal involves considerable amounts of money. According to first U.S. Government Accountability Office's estimates¹⁴, the magnitude of fraud perpetrated by Saddam Hussein in circumvention of U.N. sanctions amounts to \$10 billion (the seven-year program was worth a total of \$64 billion). There is even talk of greater sums. Taking into account a not closer specified (and non-existing!) predecessor program to oil-for-food, Safire finds that the U.N. "maladministered profiteering" probably reached \$23 billion between 1991 and 2003. The Senate Investigation Committee went on the record with a total of \$21 billion, over 60 percent of which (\$13.6 billion) are supposedly resulting from oil smuggling activities—outside the OFFP's jurisdiction. This leaves an illegal program-related revenue of \$7.5 billion.¹⁵

⁹ Ian Williams: The Right's Assault on Kofi Annan, *The Nation*, December 22, 2004.

¹⁰ The following remarks are taken from his article: Obstruction of Justice at the UN, NYT, November 16, 2004.

¹¹ Norm Coleman: Opening Statement, Hearing on the United Nation's Management and Oversight of the Oil-for-Food Program, February 15, 2005; http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/021505colemanopening.pdf. See also Robert Novak: The Senator vs. the U.N., *Townhall.com*, November 15, 2004; <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/robertnovak/rn20041115.shtml>.

¹² Norm Coleman, Kofi Annan Must Go. It's time for the secretary-general to resign. *The Opinion Journal*, December 1, 2004.

¹³ Singling out Russia and France as the main rule violators corresponds to the findings of the Duelfer report about Iraq's weapons program which was published in early 2004. Charles A. Duelfer, former UN weapons inspector led the investigations, acting in the capacity as Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence. For his report go to: http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/.

¹⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office: United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for Further Investigation, GAO-04-953T, July 8, 2004; <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04953t.pdf>.

¹⁵ Independent Inquiry Committee: Comparison of Estimates of Illicit Iraqi Income During UN Sanctions, February 3, 2005; <http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/ComparisonofEstimates.pdf>.

- Last, Coleman suspects that Kofi Annan was informed about the illegal activities of his son. Kojo Annan has been accused of having taken money from the Swiss company Cotecna which was hired by the U.N. to monitor Iraq's humanitarian imports.¹⁶

Obstruction of justice, nurturing terrorism, Russia and France as Saddam's main accomplices, billions of dollars abused, a personal conflict of interest—strong yet unproven accusations. For example, the Volcker Commission conducted a separate and more thorough investigation but could not find any conclusive evidence that Annan knew about Cotecna's bid in 1998 or his son's continued employment for the Swiss company.¹⁷ The exact connections between Kojo, Cotecna, and the former Iraqi government remain obscure. Regardless, Annan's critics insist the U.N. Secretary-General should step down.

Whatever the actual amount of bribes or whether the other allegations (such as the terrorist connection) are true, the investigators will have a hard time to make themselves heard. Since the beginning, the panel's work has been met with suspicion. Although a highly respected person in the United States, Paul Volcker is also former director of the U.N. Association of the United States of America and thus too closely affiliated to the U.N., critics claim, to lead an independent inquiry into U.N. practices.¹⁸ The entire Volcker team is said to be lacking credibility. The U.S. Senate investigators find it particularly disturbing that his panel has no subpoena power, the U.N. financed it and Annan decides which information is public.

To challenge the U.N.'s credibility even more, former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's name has been thrown into the mix. He is connected with the OFFP, because it was established under his watch in 1996 and with his outspoken support.¹⁹ The Volcker Committee does not accuse Boutros-Ghali of corruption or a conflict of interests. Yet, it indicates that he might have violated U.N.'s financial regulations by choosing the French bank GNP over a cheaper bidder to manage the OFFP's escrow funds. The Committee also reveals that Sevan arranged for oil deals between Iraq and AMEP, a Panama oil company led by Fakhry Abdelnour. The latter is an Egyptian business man—and a close relative of Boutros-Ghali.²⁰ As if this were not enough, Boutros-Ghali's brother-in-law Fred Nadler was identified as having acted as a middleman between Sevan and Abdelnour. This surely smacks of favoritism based on family ties. Boutros-Ghali felt compelled to react and defended the program's humanitarian successes in the U.S. media, not without expressing his contempt with the current U.S. Administration.²¹ Given his troubled past with the U.S. (which will be discussed in detail below), he only further discredited the OFFP instead of lowering the damage.

¹⁶ Claudia Rosette, Senior Fellow of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, was one of the first to pick up and report on the Kojo Annan story. Claudia Rosette: Kojo & Kofi. Unbelievable U.N. stories, *The National Review*, May 10, 2004; <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosett200403101819.asp>.

¹⁷ Independent Inquiry Commission into the UN Oil-for-Food Programme: Second Interim Report, March 29, 2005; <http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportMar2005.pdf>.

¹⁸ Questions for Paul Volcker, *Washington Times*, January 13, 2005; <http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050131-094233-7432r.htm>.

¹⁹ For an account of Boutros-Ghali's efforts to get Iraq to commit to the program while balancing out the pressure of the U.S. and Great Britain, see his book: *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga*, Random House 1999.

²⁰ Something's rotten, *The Economist*, February 11-18, 2005.

²¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Allegations over Iraq oil-for-food programme point to a drive to tarnish image of the UN, *Financial Times*, February 14, 2005.

After all, Boutros-Ghali is not tipping the scales in the OFFP scandal; it is the Volcker Committee and the many details yet to be investigated. Besides its attempts to defuse the criticism and restore its own reputation²², the Committee gets prepared to tackle one hot topic: the issue of primary responsibility. The major controversy evolves around the question of who was in charge of supervising the OFFP: the Secretariat or the U.N. Security Council? Clearly, Coleman and Gardiner wish to put the entire blame on the U.N. Secretariat and Annan, in disregard of the fact that while the U.N. was in administrative control of OFFP, the U.N. Security Council Sanctions (661) Committee was responsible for the (day-to-day) political and strategic oversight of the program. At this point the United States comes into play; widely missing in Coleman's accounts of the OFFP scandal.

Clueless superpower?

The United States holds a prominent position on the 661 Committee, as do all other permanent Security Council members. Therefore, it would be naïve to think that the superpower was unaware of the OFFP's loopholes. The 661 Committee received piles of reports between 1996 and 2003. It is well documented that the U.S. used its veto power to deny contracts that raised concerns about dual-use goods being delivered to Iraq in over a thousand cases. Between 2000 and the beginning of the war on Iraq in March 2003, when the first signs of corruption emerged, U.N. officials are reported to have warned the 661 Committee about 70 potentially over-priced contracts. Oddly, the Committee did not cancel any such contracts.²³ The U.S. State Department claimed that it was the U.S. who had been reporting instances of corruption first, to no avail; and then decided not to take further action in order not to endanger the program.²⁴

Apparently, the Sanctions Committee could not find a consensus as to whether (and how) to deal with over-priced contracts. The key question is: To what extent Security Council members benefited from the Iraqi sanctions? So far, only little is known about American companies dealing with the former Iraqi regime illegally. The Duelfer report on Iraq's weapons programs does not contain the name of a single U.S. corporation—reportedly due to CIA censorship and in reference to U.S. privacy laws. According to media reports, American firms also profited from the OFFP by receiving oil vouchers, probably worth a total of over a hundred million dollars. A recent Senate report found that U.S. oil purchases accounted for over 50 percent of the kickbacks paid to Saddam's regime.²⁵ Further, it has been confirmed that the U.S. government deliberately turned a blind eye to violations of the sanctions.²⁶ The acquiescence of U.S. officials on the issue

²² For example, Volcker made U.N. internal audit reports public in early 2005.

²³ For a full account of the facts on and myths surrounding the OFFP, see the website www.oilforfoodfacts.org, sponsored by the U.N. Foundation.

²⁴ U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman: The UN Oil-for-Food Program: Uncovering the Facts and Preventing Abuse, February 3, 2005; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/41576.htm>.

²⁵ Julian Borger and Jamie Wilson: US Backed Illegal Iraqi Oil Deal, *The Guardian*, May 17, 2005; <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/oilforfood/2005/0517backed.htm>. Also see: Charles Lane: Privacy Act, Order Shielded U.S. Names on List, *The Washington Post*, October 8, 2004; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16201-2004Oct7.html>. Another news report revealed early as 2000 that at least a dozen of U.S. firms, through overseas subsidiaries and affiliates, earned millions of dollars in contracts with Baghdad. Carola Hoyos: A discreet way of doing business with Iraq, *Financial Times*, November 3, 2000.

²⁶ Elise Labott and Phil Hirschhorn: Documents: U.S. condoned Iraq oil smuggling Lane: Trade was an open secret in administration, U.N., CNN, February 2, 2005; <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/02/iraq.oil.smuggle/>.

of illicit oil shipments from Iraq to U.S. allies, such as Jordan, is alone worth mentioning because of the sheer magnitude of these activities: \$13 billion according to the Senate investigation (or \$5.6 billion according to the GAO). Preventing the oil smuggling was outside the OFFP's jurisdiction because of the U.N.'s lack of military power. A multinational maritime task force had taken over the task. Controlled by the U.S. Navy, it obviously failed to enforce the sanctions, allowing billions of dollar slip through the nets.

Despite the U.N. auditing was flawed, the United States has similar questions of misappropriation to investigate. The reconstruction of Iraq is where the OFFP story continues. According to a GAO report²⁷, contracts worth \$20 billions of Iraqi oil dollars were awarded by the Coalition Provisional Authority between early 2003 and 2004, with no or imperfect bidding. Not only went half of the money to Halliburton's subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root, for the purpose of rebuilding Iraq's oil infrastructure. Halliburton has also been accused of hundreds of millions of dollars in improper charges, as the Pentagon's Defense Contract Audit Agency found out.²⁸ Meanwhile, the CPA has difficulties in accounting for several hundred millions of reconstruction dollars.

This excursion into the program's ramifications, far from complete, demonstrates how one-sided and limited the views presented in the U.S. media tend to be. Capturing the larger picture of the program reveals that the lines of authority do not point to the U.N. (Secretary-General) alone but very often go all the way down to the United States. There are loopholes and flaws to be found on every level of the decision-making process. Many questions remain open until the Volcker commission will have finished its investigations into the role of the Security Council Sanctions Committee, and other facets of the OFFP. The final report, due in summer 2005, may not separate all myth from fact. Whichever side might prevail—the Volcker Committee's findings or the view of Coleman and other U.N. critics—, fact is that the reputation of the U.N. has suffered tremendously since the OFFP news first broke.

In the following, the U.N. blueprint for reform, an integral part of the U.N. Millennium Development Goals and the centerpiece of Annan's remaining two years in office, will be briefly introduced. It will then be tested whether the U.S. domestic political situation generally allows for implementing this reform package and what lessons can be specifically learned from Boutros-Ghali's failure to keep the right balance with the United States.

2. Introducing the blueprint for U.N. reform

Coleman's premature call for Annan's resignation in early December 2004 goes beyond criticizing the OFFP. Only a few days later, the report of the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (HLP) was released.²⁹ Coleman's timing caused speculations as to whether he intended to take the steam out of the reform panel's report. (*See the DIAS interview with Ingrid Leb-*

²⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office: Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges, GAO-04-605, June 1, 2004; www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/gettrpt?GAO-04-605.pdf.

²⁸ Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Government Reform: Fact Sheet. Halliburton's Iraq Contracts Now Worth over \$10 Billion U.S., House of Representatives, December 9, 2004; http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/121004A.shtml.

²⁹ See "A more secure world. Our shared responsibility. Report of the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change"; <http://www.un.org/secureworld>.

mann. A summary of the High-Level Panel report can be found in the DIAS article of Jessica Heun.) The Volcker report helped quell criticism of the United Nations, as U.N. expert Jeff Laurenti argued during a discussion on the HLP report in Berlin in late January.³⁰ Indeed, the U.N. might have bought some time; valuable time it needs to prepare the ground for a broad-based effort to put the Panel's recommendations into practice, as Annan urges in his introduction to the "In Larger Freedom" report: "These are reforms that are within reach (...) If we act boldly—and if we act together—we can make people everywhere more secure, more prosperous, and better able to enjoy their fundamental rights." It is a unique and perhaps the last opportunity to launch a reform of the antiquated U.N. system.

With its 101 recommendations to strengthen and reform the U.N., the HLP laid the groundwork for the Secretary-General's blueprint which aims at improving the organization's ability to deal with security, development as well as human rights challenges. The HLP report offers an encompassing threat definition as well as a wide variety of action steps. Annan took over almost all of the HLP recommendations and modified some. Some observers find his reform proposals "cautious, if not conservative".³¹ In general, the proposals are considered not overly progressive, visionary or powerful (particularly in the fields of development and human rights) but nonetheless innovative and action-oriented.³² The creation of a Peacebuilding Committee, for instance, is an appealing idea to better connect the approaches of early-warning, conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, which have not shown much effect in the past if pursued individually.

In terms of institutional reform, the HLP proposes two models for an enlarged U.N. Security Council, both of which refuse to strip the major five off their veto power. According to Sir David Hannay, member of the High-Level Panel, the experts sought to apply some pragmatism in all of their recommendations.³³ Annan followed this example and added a major U.S. concern to his own reform list. Because the U.N. Human Rights Commission would suffer from "declining responsibility and professionalism", Annan suggested replacing it with a smaller standing Human Rights Council—a sweetener for the United States to support U.N. reform.

3. On the same road to failure as the "Agenda for Peace"?

For a good reason: the crux is that without the United States, there will be no U.N. reform. If Annan cannot (re)gain the trust and secure the support of the United States, U.N. reform most likely will not succeed, at least not to an extent where the U.N. is enabled to play a more decisive role in international affairs.

³⁰ Toward a More Secure World? The Report of the UN High-Level-Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, Discussion meeting, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Berlin, February 23, 2005.

³¹ Time to Look Beyond Mere Administrative Reforms, Financial Express, April 26, 2005; <http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/annan/2005/0426beyondadmin.htm>.

³² For a comprehensive review, see Jens Martens: In Larger Freedom. The Report of the UN Secretary-General for the Millennium+5 Summit 2005, FES Briefing Paper April 2005, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation/Global Policy Forum; <http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/annan/2005/briefing.pdf>. For an immediate reaction to Annan's report, see Jonathan Steele: Annan proposes radical UN shakeup, *The Guardian*, March 21, 2005. Also see Annan's op-ed in the *Financial Times*, March 21, 2005: An aspiration to a larger freedom.

³³ Discussion meeting, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (supra note 30).

Enhancing the U.N.'s role in global peace and security was one of the primary goals of Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda for Peace". Like Annan, he paid attention to national interests and offered realistic solutions. Yet, he lost the critical support of the United States.³⁴ The first ever Secretary-General from Africa was defenseless against the mix of personal and political attacks that mostly took root in U.S. Congress in 1992/93. U.S. pressure ousted him from office in 1996. For the first time, a U.N. Secretary-General was denied a second term. Boutros-Ghali's ambitious "Agenda for Peace" to reform U.N. peacekeeping was past; nation-building became a taboo term in the United States.

In the following, drawing upon the lessons of Boutros-Ghali's tenure as the first post-Cold war U.N. Secretary-General will help explain why we might face yet another low point in U.S.-U.N. relations, as well as illustrate in more detail which turn U.N. reform might take. There are striking similarities between Annan's and Boutros-Ghali's relationship with the United States, as well as significant differences. To start with, the general domestic political conditions for reform will be examined. Can Annan's reforms expect to find acceptance within the United States?

Unfavorable domestic conditions

In general, U.S. attitudes vis-à-vis the U.N. and U.N. reform have not changed much since Boutros-Ghali's term. Most of the American public thinks positively about the United Nations, providing a stark contrast to the majority of U.S. policy-makers' anti-U.N. stance. U.S. Congress still tends to be the driving force behind all major assaults on the United Nations. The main difference is that Congress today acts with the agreement of the Administration.

It is not a big secret that the Bush Administration has mixed feelings about multilateral organizations and the United Nations in particular. In the run-up to the Iraqi war, President Bush, along with former Security Advisor Rice and Vice President Cheney, loudly lamented about the U.N.'s impotence. Such general criticism has ebbed noticeably. Senior officials have been showing some rare moderation and restraint during the OFFP controversy. Although Bush refused to back Annan as other head of states have done lately, he avoided any verbal provocation. The same rule seems to apply to the issue of U.N. reform: The HLP report was welcomed by the White House. However, it failed to secure the endorsement of senior U.S. officials in charge of the issue of U.N. reform.³⁵ They delivered mixed responses: Whereas the U.N. strategies to fight terrorism and the proliferation of WMD were embraced as being consistent with U.S. policies (more precisely, with the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative), the reaction to the recommendations for improving U.N. capabilities on peacekeeping and post conflict peace-building was lukewarm at best. The idea that a state's (preventive) use of force would require prior Security Council approval was bluntly rejected. Instead, the U.S. officials issued routine demands: more trans-

³⁴ For an analysis of Boutros-Ghali's political and moral powers and his relationship with the U.S., see Henrike Paepcke: *Die friedens- und sicherheitspolitische Rolle der UN-Generalsekretärs im Wandel: Das kritische Verhältnis zwischen Boutros Boutros-Ghali und den USA* [The changing peace and security role of the UN Secretary-General: The critical relationship between Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the United States] Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2004.

³⁵ Statement by Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, U.S. Representative for United Nations Management and Reform, on the Report of the High Level Panel on Reform, in an Informal Meeting of the General Assembly, January 31, 2005; http://www.un.int/usa/05_013.htm. See also the remarks of Kim Holmes, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs: Why Multilateral Organizations Are Important to the United States, Remarks to Participants of the Senate Youth Program 2005, Washington, DC, March 1, 2005; <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/43137.htm>.

parency, more accountability, more external (U.S.) oversight—and less costs. Washington’s lack of interest in changing the status quo, i.e. the existing balance of power, is obvious.

It is quite smart of the Administration to lean back and let Congress and others do all the fighting. Being soft on the U.N. Secretary-General is likely to happen for political reasons, with a close eye on global public opinion. U.N. Foundation president Tim Wirth, in an interview with Fox TV-host Bill O’Reilly last December, made a sound point when he said that the world, including the American public, strongly supports the United Nations.³⁶ A recent poll conducted in 23 countries finds “nearly universal support for dramatic reforms in the United Nations”. 59 percent of Americans surveyed are favorable of the U.N. becoming “significantly more powerful in world affairs”.³⁷ Although he is not very well known to the common American citizen, Annan gets credit for his work. In 1998, 53 percent of Americans approved of Annan’s job performance (compared to Boutros-Ghali’s rather marginal 33 percent).³⁸ In a poll from late 2001, when asked about their general impressions of Annan, 55 percent admitted they were “not familiar enough to say”; and of those who were, 32 percent said they were favorable.³⁹ Another recent poll paints a more negative picture: 44 percent of Americans are said to be favorable of the United Nations (63 percent of Democrats agreed with this statement whereas 64 percent of Republicans said they are totally unfavorable)—but only 25 percent of Annan.⁴⁰

These figures indicate that Annan has probably lost some of the American public’s support. It does not matter that much. The “grand jury” of U.S. Congress that ultimately decides over the future of U.N. reform has not changed its ambivalent attitude about the United Nations. The majority of Republican Congress members are still convinced that they are acting in line with their constituents’ majority point of view if they enforce anti-internationalist / anti-U.N. legislative action. Regardless of this apparent misperception⁴¹, Congress has always played a prominent role in the post-Cold war history of U.S. policy towards the United Nations. As the guardian of the U.S. purse, it is used to—and quite good at—calling the shots. For years, U.S. Congress has withheld appropriations, contributions as well as dues, for the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets. Payments were only made on the condition of U.N. reform. As a consequence of this linkage policy (money for reform), the U.N. has been on the brink of bankruptcy since the mid-80s. Boutros-Ghali once portrayed himself as the “super-beggar”; and Annan was forced to play the same role: In mid-2001, U.S. total debts to the U.N. climbed to an all-time high of over \$2.3 billion.⁴²

³⁶ Bill O’Reilly Says Bush Wants Kofi Annan Ousted, *Newsbound*, December 5, 2004; http://www.newshounds.us/2004/12/05/bill_oreilly_says_bush_wants_kofi_annan_ousted.php.

³⁷ 23-Country Poll Finds Strong Support for Dramatic Changes at UN, and for Increased UN Power, Program on International Policy Attitude (PIPA), December 2004; study available at: <http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/BBCworldpoll/032005/html/bbcpoll4.html#1>.

³⁸ Barbara Crossette: Darkest Hour at U.N. For Richest Deadbeat, *The New York Times*, September 21, 1998; <http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/docs/crosset2.htm>.

³⁹ All poll data according to the Program on International Policy Attitudes’ website (PIPA) at: http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/un/.

⁴⁰ Security and Peace Institute / The Marttila Communications Group: American Attitudes toward National Security, Foreign Policy, and the War on Terror, The Century Foundation, April 13; <http://www.tcf.org/Publications/InternationalAffairs/americanattitudes.pdf>.

⁴¹ Steven Kull / I.M. Destler: *Misreading the Public. The Myth of a New Isolationism*, Brookings Institution Press 1999.

⁴² In February 2005, the U.S. owed \$1,5 billion to the United Nations. For regular updates on the U.N. financial crisis, see the Global Policy Forum’s special section at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index.htm>.

Coleman's attacks on Annan could be pure tactics to move up on the career ladder; the power of the purse nonetheless shows that Congressional statements and policy are vital to U.N. reform and should be taken seriously. The Bush Administration may only threaten to cease further payment to the U.N. (unless the organization takes adequate action on the OFFP scandal)—the Republicans in Congress can make it happen. As was to be expected, new legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate to further reduce the cap of U.S. shares for U.N. peacekeeping costs from currently 27.1 percent to 25 percent.⁴³

Altogether, the dominant role that U.S. Congress plays within the complex U.S. policy-making setting with regard to the U.N. gives reason to fear that the U.N. might lose the momentum on reform. The domestic political situation has changed insofar as the anti-U.N. fraction in Congress as well as within the Administration has grown stronger since Boutros-Ghali's term, despite an increase in public support for the United Nations.

With that in mind, the analysis will now turn to the first of the three pillars that constitute Annan's office: his political power. The detailed review of the OFFP scandal has revealed that the major dispute evolves around the issue of political responsibility—which is the chief factor that led to the deterioration of the relationship between Boutros-Ghali and the United States. Boutros-Ghali's difficulties to enter into discussions about and eventually solve critical political problems with the Clinton Administration indicate the many challenges which still lie ahead of Annan.

Rising political tensions

The major political dispute between Boutros-Ghali and the U.S. centered on the criteria for the use of force, involving questions such as who commands U.S. soldiers in U.N. peacekeeping missions; who decides when and where to deploy U.S. soldiers; who determines when and how to use force. Boutros-Ghali's greatest concern was that the U.N. would be excluded from decision-making processes, thus denying him the possibility to offer the "international option for action". While he was convinced he had been given the mandate to speak up and deliver his views on political issues, his critics claimed that he had overstepped his boundaries by exercising political authority never granted to him. It is fact, though, that Boutros-Ghali never acted without a Security Council's mandate and thus not without asking the U.S. for permission. He never ordered U.S. troops into combat (e.g. in Mogadishu); neither did he alone order (or deny) NATO air strikes in Bosnia in 1994.

The Clinton Administration refused to support Boutros-Ghali's ambitious reform plans for U.N. peacekeeping because of the strong resistance from Congress and its own incapability to take responsibility for home-made policy failures. As a consequence, it abused Boutros-Ghali as a scapegoat. The most prominent case of abuse is Somalia: After the debacle in Mogadishu in October 1993, pressure from U.S. Congress was mounting on Clinton to change the (multilateral) course of action. In the evolving domestic political battle over who defines U.S. national security interests—Capitol Hill or the President and his team—Congressional members started to accuse Clinton of being too soft on the U.N. and a puppet of the U.N. world government. The President bent to Congressional demands and falsely blamed Boutros-Ghali for the killing of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu. The U.S. foreign policy doctrine changed. In May 2004, Clinton

⁴³ Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S.600; introduced on March 10, 2005).

issued his *Presidential Decision Directive on Peacekeeping*, a restrictive interpretation of the once highly acclaimed U.S. “multilateral engagement” formula (PDD-25). This directive nullified Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace”. Step by step, the U.N. became marginalized in U.S. foreign policy. It played only minor roles in the U.S.-led mission in Haiti or in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. U.N. peacekeeping costs were cut dramatically: from over \$3.5 million in 1994 to \$1.4 million in 1996.

Boutros-Ghali’s downfall was only a matter of time. His critics in Congress wanted him out of the office (as much as they wanted to hurt Clinton); and they knew how to best do it. They chose U.N. reform to make Boutros-Ghali blunder. He was accused of refusing to accommodate U.S. concerns and interests when he failed to meet the ever-changing list of reform benchmarks and demands that the Clinton Administration imposed on him—a list which was mainly crafted by Republican members of Congress such as (Former) House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Clinton-challenger Bob Dole. Boutros-Ghali followed most of the U.S. orders such as establishing a U.N. Office for Internal Oversight Services, but never managed to fully satisfy U.S. Congress.

A clear parallel exists regarding Annan’s current standing in Washington. He started out on a good foot. Due to the severe cutback in U.N. peacekeeping operations, the U.S. had no reason to quarrel with Annan over his political authority and decision-making powers in peacekeeping affairs. Following his appointment in early 1997, a honeymoon period between the U.S. and the U.N. occurred. Annan complied with U.S. demands and delivered his first reform plan that included downsizing the U.N. Secretariat personnel, suspending global conferences, and introducing numerous managerial and structural changes. Then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Richard Holbrooke, settled most of the dispute over the U.S. due payments to the U.N. in 2000. Kosovo turned out to be a hard test for the U.N. since it had no voice over the use of force but the heated debate about the legitimacy of the intervention soon faded. Annan retreated from criticizing the NATO coalition partners and put all his weight behind the Millenium Development Goals. It is a first sign that he understood what he confronted and then prioritized what was viable.

His “low-profile” phase ended with the beginning of the first Bush administration and its unilateral policy vis-à-vis international treaties and regimes. Annan, usually soft-spoken, polite and “a very distinguished gentleman” (according to former Secretary of State Powell⁴⁴), was carried away in the stream of the inexorable U.S. invasion of Iraq. He spoke out publicly against the U.S. violating the U.N. Charter and called the intervention illegal. Promptly, he joined the ranks of Washington’s top political opponents, comprising all those who had the audacity to protest the war or speak of one of the greatest failures ever in U.S. history. As Clinton in 1993, the Bush team has started to look for ways to distract the public attention from its failure to pacify Iraq. The OFFP scandal was the perfect occasion to accuse Annan of overstepping his authority as well as ill-managing the organization—the exactly same phrases today that were brought into play to attack Boutros-Ghali post-Mogadishu. Taking into account the U.S. cool reaction to Boutros-Ghali’s attempts to comply with U.S. demands for U.N. reform, once he had challenged the superpower, it seems that Annan’s reform plans will have no future.

As was mentioned earlier, Annan has settled to appease the superpower. In his blueprint for reform, he avoids taking position on highly contested political issues. For example, he does

⁴⁴ Fox News: Secretary of State Powell Talks With Sean Hannity, Thursday, January 13, 2005.

not provide the ultimate criteria for the use of military force which would have forced him to rule out the unilateral option.⁴⁵ He has delivered the impetus—and leaves it now to the member states to find a consensus on a global terrorism convention, for instance. Apparently, Annan has recognized that he cannot push the U.S. any further.

Yet, it may be too late for him to put on the brakes. (Even Boutros-Ghali was always smart enough to refer political issues such as Security Council reform to the member states.) Annan's opposition to the Iraqi war weighs more than anything else, and the U.S. Administration's willingness to meet him at least halfway on the issue of U.N. reform is more than limited. Other evolving scandals such as the sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo only add fuel to the fire and strengthen the U.S. conviction of keeping Annan and the organization that he leads on a strict(er) leash. U.N. critics have already been quick to gather collections of Annan's political failures, starting with his responsibility to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994.⁴⁶ This is a clear warning sign. The list of complaints about Boutros-Ghali was already fairly long, when he took a chance and issued the Israel-critical report on the massacre in Qana in 1996. This faux pas encouraged the Clinton Administration to finally break his political neck; and any similar provocation—or eventually, an incriminating report of one of the numerous investigation committees—could break Annan's, too.

Personal attacks

Annan would still have a small chance to survive politically, if the attacks on his office had not been taken to the next level. The personalization of political disputes was the driving force and crystallized the deterioration of the relationship between Boutros-Ghali and the Clinton Administration. Boutros-Ghali, refusing to take the sole responsibility for an ill-designed “safe haven” policy in Bosnia or the U.S.-led hunt for Somali warlord Aideed in Mogadishu, decided that he could not work with the U.S. and consequently would not need to consult with his U.S. counterparts anymore.

The lack of communication between him and members of the Clinton Administration proved fatal as neither party ever reconciled any contested matter. Though not publicly antagonizing his U.S. counterparts until the very last six months of his term, Boutros-Ghali's arguments with U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright received plenty of media attention. Never an overly pleasant and charming person according to U.N. insiders reports (filling lengthy news report about Boutros-Ghali's “flawed character traits”), he was stigmatized as being anti-American. Albright became his nemesis, launching and then succeeding in her campaign to prevent his re-election.

With this development in mind, it is highly concerning that Annan's personal integrity and leadership style have been called into question in a similar fashion: “stubborn,” “a U.N. secretary general who can barely disguise his hatred and contempt for American foreign policy,” “a spectacular failure, a monumental mediocrity, and a shameless appeaser of dictators” are just a few examples of how Annan finds himself described in the U.S. media these days.⁴⁷ American TV

⁴⁵ For a detailed comment on this topic, see Colum Lynch: Annan Drafts Changes For U.N. Use of Force, Terrorism Among Issues Targeted, *Washington Post*, March 20, 2005.

⁴⁶ For instance, Ed Lasky: A tsUNami hits Annan and friends at Turtle Bay, *The American Thinker*, January 18, 2005; http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=4190.

⁴⁷ Nile Gardiner: Kofi Annan and the United Nations, *Capitalism Magazine*, December 13, 2004; <http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4059>.

stations are airing “get out of the UN”-commercials (sponsored by the organization Move America Forward) with footage of Annan shaking hands with Arafat, Castro, and Saddam.

Regardless of the different temperaments of Boutros-Ghali and Annan, both have in common that they could not / cannot get any respect from the United States. Annan has refrained from striking back at (single members of) the U.S. government or Congress—so far—and even managed to offer warm words about John Bolton, one of the fiercest U.N. critics who has been nominated as new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. This tactic might only temporarily defuse the political tension, as it does not solve Annan’s general problem that he lacks a supporting voice in Washington. After losing his valuable intermediary, Holbrooke, Annan has been trying to better connect to Republican Washington by increasing the U.N. presence in the U.S. capital. Yet, the times when he had a media-celebrated coffee with Republican heavy-weight Jesse Helms (1997) are long gone. In the midst of the OFFP scandal, Annan met eye-to-eye with Bush Administration officials. Yet, such sporadic action is not enough to contain the inflammatory rhetoric that dominates the U.S. media nowadays. When Boutros-Ghali decided in 1996 to finally correct some of the false reporting about him, it was already too late to improve his negative image. His moral authority, the third pillar of his office, was seriously undermined. Will Annan be able to prevent his from happening?

Shattered moral voice

With no hard power at hand, lots of bad press and restricted access to U.S. policy-makers, Annan is about to lose his soft power, particularly his power of persuasion, to make the case why the international community—including the U.S.—should make a concerted effort to take action on his report. Making appeals to the global audience is a powerful tool in the hands of the U.N. Secretary-General but it can be easily turned against him.

Having lost his right to say in political decision-making processes by the end of 1993, Boutros-Ghali was content with exercising moral pressure only. When he insisted on preserving the U.N.’s sole authority to decide about the use of force, however, American U.N. critics interpreted this as an attack on U.S. sovereignty. His appeals to global moral standards—his commitment to equality among all states or to international law, for instance—were misconceived as a claims for world leadership. His adversaries had an easy game to belie him as a power-driven threat to U.S. national interests and values, because Boutros-Ghali was unable to provide the U.S. Administration, Congress or the American public with a clear and realistic vision of the organization’s and his own (fairly limited) role in international policy-making.

Today, neo-conservative think tanks such as the Project for the New American Century have not only defined Bush’s political and moral agenda but have also taken the lead in the ongoing campaign against Annan and the United Nations. Cheering and promoting the war against Iraq, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies⁴⁸ is undermining any of Annan’s effort to make an appeal in favor of the U.N.’s main principles. The project *Get Us out! of the United Nations* ill reputes the so-called “world government United Nations” as a serious threat to the freedom of all Americans. So far, Annan has avoided any direct confrontation, which could pay off for him. There is ample reason to believe that the neo-cons’ value-driven agenda will rather provoke greater controversies on the international stage, especially now that John Bolton has been nomi-

⁴⁸ The resolution passed in January 2004. The full text is available at: <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/>.

nated as the new Ambassador to the U.N. The main problem is Bolton's clear opposition to basic U.N. principles and international law, not necessarily his no-nonsense stance on many U.N.-related issues. Moreover, the ongoing dispute over the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction demonstrates that the defense of U.S. sovereignty is a high priority for U.S. policy-makers; and it should not be forgotten that it is an issue which resonates well with the American public, too.

With the OFFP scandal unresolved, Annan's moral authority is shattered but not seriously damaged. In addition, we can expect the Europeans to play a greater role in defending the U.N. principles than they did during the 90s. This leads to the final point: an outlook on Annan's future.

4. The next Secretary-General and U.N. reform—firmly under U.S. control

The Agenda for Peace was squeezed to death in 1994, because the three pillars that define the U.N. Secretary-General's office—his political power, personal integrity, and moral authority—collapsed one after the other. Republicans in Congress, looking for ways to increase its influence in U.S. foreign policy decision-making, were successful in creating a negative image of Boutros-Ghali in preparation and support of the conservative revolution in Fall 1994.

Today, Congress and the Administration have joined forces to make a stance in terms of U.S. global supremacy. For the Bush Administration, the anti-Annan campaign is extremely useful as it helps divert the attention from its own failures in connection with the OFFP but also from larger foreign policy failures such as the lack of peace and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, the U.S. is attacking a U.N. Secretary-General under the pretext of defending its sovereignty. Like Boutros-Ghali, Annan is presented as a political threat to the U.S., led by moral hubris and driven by anti-Americanism. If U.S. Congress succeeds on all fronts (in opposing the International Criminal Court, Annan, payment of U.S. dues to the U.N., or reform of the U.N.), remains to be seen. The neo-cons in Congress have the full backing of the government which pursues a strategy of "continuing the unilateral path without alienating our allies". This leaves one last question: What are the short- to mid-term prospects of restoring U.S. confidence in the U.N., if possible at all?

The outlook is grim. The OFFP scandal triggered some significant action in the United States, including calls for U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations (which are not new in the history of U.S.-U.N. relations). This is not necessarily the end of all U.S. efforts to make the U.N. a more useful and effective tool in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Institute of Peace organizes the work of a new Congress-mandated, bipartisan Task Force on U.N. reform⁴⁹, co-chaired by George Mitchell, a Maine Democrat and former Senate Majority leader, and Newt Gingrich⁵⁰. The task force is expected to explore if and how the U.N. can better serve American interests; or in the words of Mitchell and Gingrich, they will approach U.N. reform "from the perspective of American interests and American responsibilities, not on the basis of an abstract notion of inter-

⁴⁹ See www.usip.org/un.

⁵⁰ Congress also arranged for U.N.-related hearings including former U.S. Ambassadors to the United Nations.

national community or of the concerns of other countries.”⁵¹ The Task Force, which will also draw upon the expertise of leading U.S. think tanks, is expected to present its reform plan by June so that Congress and the Administration could act on the recommendations before the U.N. General Assembly meeting in Fall.

Europe will have difficulties to follow suit. It is impossible to imagine a U.N. Reform Task Force being established anywhere in Europe anytime soon. This is not the place to discuss the European response to U.N. reform plans in further detail.⁵² Suffice to say that the reaction was quite limited. Germany almost exclusively focused on the report’s institutional reform section, which is disappointing but understandable given its persistent claim for a permanent Security Council seat.

In the long term, joint European action on U.N. reform could turn the wheel around. In the foreseeable future, however, U.S. Congress and the Bush Administration will remain in charge of setting the frame for U.N. reform. Even if Annan manages to last until the official end of his term (late 2006), the Bush administration will then use the opportunity to handpick a U.N. Secretary-General to its liking. In 1996, Clinton was looking for a manager, more Secretary than General, and Annan was a pleasant partner for a Democratic Administration, someone with whom Holbrook could work.

Not surprisingly, Annan is still too independent of a mind to handle the Republicans’ appetite for less U.N. In late 2006, the Bush Administration will make sure the next U.N. Secretary-General will fit the role of a bureaucrat, finally someone who thinks like the U.S., as Bolton has always wished for. In 1996 he explained his vision of the ideal candidate as follows: „(the U.S. is) not interested in finding either a ‚president of the world’ or a diplomatic free-lancer, but rather a ‚chief administrative officer’ as specified in Article 97 of the U.N. Charter (...) not a U.N. cheerleader, someone who might get so carried away on behalf of the organization that he or she forgot who paid the salaries.“⁵³

Annan has become aware of his boundaries. While trying to find the right tone and offering reform options that are compatible with U.S. interests, he aims at building a broader momentum for U.N. reform. Besides balancing out political interests, Annan is also acting under enormous time pressure. He hopes to come to an agreement on the necessary reforms at the summit of world leaders at U.N. headquarters in September 2005, the organization’s 60th anniversary. His goal to get the impossible done by then is even more ambitious, as he wishes to take action on the entire reform package, not only on single items.⁵⁴

Whether he will succeed depends on how well the Europeans will act jointly on the issue on U.N. (Security Council) reform as well as on the outcome of the ongoing OFFP investigations. In regard to the latter, the coming weeks and months will tell whether Annan’s job will eventually turn into hell. If worse comes to worst, losing Annan due to U.S. opposition would be a nightmare scenario since the reform process will lose greatly in substance and in speed. A vari-

⁵¹ Newt Gingrich / George Mitchell: U.N.: 60 and at crossroads, *Washington Times*, February 9, 2005; <http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20050208-083631-9309r.htm>.

⁵² For a comprehensive overview of world-wide reactions to Annan’s reform plans, see the website of a new initiative which aims to foster civil society’s and parliamentarians’ participation in the discussion on U.N. reform: www.reformtheun.org.

⁵³ Hearing Bolton before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Human Rights, House Committee on International Relations on Selecting the Next United Nations Secretary General, September 24, 1996.

⁵⁴ The U.N. Secretary-General, Statement to the General Assembly, New York, March 21, 2005.

ety of “weak” reform options does not necessarily depend on Annan; ideas such as overhauling U.N. rules of procedure in order to increase the level of transparency and democracy within the U.N. system, for instance. As the OFFP scandal shows, it is key to make the U.N. a more effective, accountable and democratic institution. However, the grand vision that Annan’s reform package offers will be destroyed.

After all, chances are high that Annan will not get decapitated like Boutros-Ghali was. It is unlikely that the U.S. Administration will challenge its allies by forcing Annan out of office. The Bush team will probably stall any major action on U.N. reform until Annan’s time is officially over. Since Annan has chosen to be less outspoken than Boutros-Ghali, the American U.N. critics can endure a “quiet” U.N. Secretary-General and still make their case: demonstrate that the U.S. dominates global policy-making and the United Nations.

DIAS ANALYSIS

- 1 Rainer Winkler August 2003
The War in Iraq and Germany's 2002 election campaign
- 2 Rouven Klein October 2003
Europe's Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): Finality of the European integration and a project of eternal peace. A concept based on Dieter Senghaas' Theory of Civilization
- 3 Michaela C. Hertkorn November 2003
Why German-U.S. Relations Matter to the Alliance. Germany's theoretically evolving role as center power in Europe (also available in German)
- 4 Heiko Borchert December 2003
Linking Corporate Governance with Good Governance: An Increasingly Important Foreign Policy Task
- 5 Heiko Borchert / Daniel Maurer January 2004
Comeback, Toolkit, or Dissolution? Five Scenarios for NATO's Future
- 6 Marc Houben July 2004
Operations in Iraq. The New Face of International Crisis Management
- 7 Michaela Hertkorn August 2004
Why German-US Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance: One Year After the War in Iraq
- 8 Dimitrios Argirakos November 2004
The Bush Doctrine
- 9 Babak Khalatbari and Marc Lauterfeld November 2004
Under Full Sail in a Millennium of Migration? Enlargement in the East and „Push and Pull Factors“ in the South
- 10 Babak Khalatbari und Marc Lauterfeld November 2004
A Libyan Fairy Tale from Arabian Nights. How a “mad dog” became a “respectable paper tiger”
- 11 Dustin Dehéz und Babak Khalatbari February 2005
The regional dimension of globalized geopolitics. Consequences for state and society
- 12 Marwan Abou-Taam February 2005
Psychology of Terror – Violence as an identification mark in the Arab-Islamic Society
- 13 Roman Schmidt-Radefeldt April 2005
The development of the European Security and Defense Policy and the European Constitution: On the road to a European army?
- 14 Henrike Paepcke May 2005
Another U.N. Secretary-General soon decapitated?

DIAS ANALYSIS are available for download from the Institute's website: www.dias-online.org.

Duesseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS)

Founded in 2003, DIAS is an independent, interdisciplinary policy think tank at the Heinrich-Heine-University of Duesseldorf, Germany. Our purpose is to address the broad spectrum of foreign and security policy topics, thereby paying attention to different disciplines such as political science, management studies, economics, history, and international public law. DIAS offers a forum for young academics and leaders to exchange views and ideas on foreign and security policy issues and provides consulting services and strategic advice to clients in the public and private sectors. DIAS also seeks to better inform and engage the interested public by convening discussions, round tables and other open events. To this purpose it organizes an annual Security Conference and task forces with policy-makers, NGOs, academics, business representatives, the public, and the media.

© Copyright 2005, Düsseldorf Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Universitätsstrasse 1, D-40225 Düsseldorf, www.dias-online.org